Political Memes and Fake News Discourses on Instagram by Al-Rawi, Ahmed
Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 276–290
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v9i1.3533
Article
Political Memes and Fake News Discourses on Instagram
Ahmed Al-Rawi
School of Communication, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, V5A 1S6, Canada; E-Mail: aalrawi@sfu.ca
Submitted: 31 July 2020 | Accepted: 22 August 2020 | Published: 3 March 2021
Abstract
Political memes have been previously studied in different contexts, but this study fills a gap in literature by employing a
mixed method to provide insight into the discourses of fake news on Instagram. The author collected more than 550,000
Instagram posts sent by over 198,000 unique users from 24 February 2012 to 21 December 2018, using the hashtag
#fakenews as a search term. The study uses topic modelling to identify the most recurrent topics that are dominant on
the platform, while the most active users are identified to understand the nature of the online communities that discuss
fake news. In addition, the study offers an analysis of visual metadata that accompanies Instagram images. The findings
indicate that Instagram has become a weaponized toxic platform, and the largest community of active users are support-
ers of the US President Donald Trump and the Republican Party, mostly trolling liberal mainstream media especially CNN,
while often aligning themselves with the far-right. On the other hand, a much smaller online community attempts to troll
Trump and the Republicans. Theoretically, the study relies on political memes literature and argues that Instagram has
become weaponized through an ongoing ‘Meme War,’ for many members in the two main online communities troll and
attack each other to exert power on the platform.
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1. Introduction
This study started as an exploratory one to investigate
the hashtag #fakenews on Instagram, but the researcher
was surprised to find the extent of political polarization,
racism, and hate on this platform around this issue which
prompted him to pursue this project in more detail since
it was possible to collect data referencing to a hashtag
on Instagram. The research empirically examines fake
news discourses on Instagram by focusing on memes and
offers a unique analysis of visual metadata, a feature
that has not been examined before in relation to the
quantitative analysis of visual discourses on Instagram.
From a theoretical point of view, the article attempts to
expand on the political memes literature by arguing that
Instagram has become a weaponized platform despite its
reputation in popular culture as a cool space for young
people to post their selfies, food, and travel pictures.
Here, political memes are designed and disseminated to
troll opponents in different online communities in what
appears to be a Meme War founded on ideological differ-
ences and beliefs (Al-Rawi, 2020). The continuation and
enhancement of this Meme War is facilitated by the plat-
form’s positive apolitical reputation and structure that is
built on sharing funny memes, yet the reality is different
and far more toxic than is thought, as will be shown here.
Instagram has been largely understudied due to the
difficulty of obtaining large datasets from this platform
(Highfield & Leaver, 2015). Unlike the case of other
social media outlets like Twitter and Facebook, the oth-
er unique aspect of this research study is that it inves-
tigates fake news discourses on Instagram as previous
studies analyzed fake news on other social media plat-
forms and mainstream media, as well as the use of bots
(Al-Rawi, 2019a; Al-Rawi, Groshek, & Zhang, 2019; Lazer
et al., 2018; Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018).
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2. Literature Review
This article focuses on political memes and how they are
used in relation to fake news discourses on social media
partly following the recommendation made by Leskovec,
Backstrom, and Kleinberg (2009) on the importance of
studying political memes and their diffusion. In its basic
form, a meme is part of today’s participatory and main-
stream culture (Jenkins, 2006) and is generally defined as
an “image, video, piece of text, etc., typically humorous
in nature, that is copied and spread rapidly by internet
users, often with slight variations” (Meme, 2020). A more
detailed definition is presented here:
Internet memes are digital texts—verbal, visual, or
audial—that share common attributes and under-
go varia tions by multiple users. They are created
with awareness of one another, and they require
prior acquaintance for proper production and con-
sumption, as the repetitive (or memetic) element of
the text often incorporates coded cultural informa-
tion essential for proper interpretation….This prac-
tice facilitates, on the one hand, the expression of
originality and creativity, and, on the other, a sense
of belonging to a cultural collective. In this sense, the
memetic practice meets both the demand for individ-
ualism and the yearning to belong characteristic of
partic ipatory culture. (Gal, 2018, pp. 529–530)
The term was first introduced by Richard Dawkins, a biol-
ogist, who mentioned that memes are transmitted units
of culture which are similar to genes because they are
disseminated either by copying or imitation (Dawkins,
1976). Indeed, memes have become very popular today
because of social media. Similar to viral content, many
memes are widely shared on Social Networking Sites
(SNS), and they often replicate and reappear in different
formats, shapes, and contexts (Tay, 2014, p. 48). Hence,
memes are understood to be “socially constructed public
discourses in which different memetic variants represent
diverse voices and perspectives” (Shifman, 2014, p. 7).
One of the important features of memes is their
importance in bringing digital communities together
(Nissenbaum & Shifman, 2017, p. 485). Here, Limor
Shifman stresses that memes operate on microlevel due
to their associated and engaged small online communi-
ties, but they are also vital at the macrolevel because
they often shape public discourses and enhance collec-
tive identities (Shifman, 2012). Indeed, they “play an inte-
gral part in some of the defining events of the twenty-
first century” (Shifman, 2014, p. 6). In other words, many
digital communities share and disseminate relevant
memes that reflect their ideologies through which they
practice gatekeeping activities (Burgess, 2008; Miltner,
2014). In this regard, memes are understood to be
cultural productions produced and/or disseminated by
activists, sometimes called “warriors,” in their efforts to
oppose and possibly change the status quo (Lasn, 2012,
p. 147); even the dissemination of these memes is consid-
ered “a product of societal and communal coordination”
(Nissenbaum & Shifman, 2017, p. 485). Shifman (2014)
mentions here that memes have three functions: as
forms of persuasion or political advocacy, as grassroots
action, and as expression and public discussion (p. 122).
Due to these functions, memes carry power which is
why many online users are “fighting for the hegemony of
memes” in what is known as “memes warfare” (Häkkinen
& Leppänen, 2014, p. 7, 19). In this regard, Nissenbaum
and Shifman (2017) emphasize that memes have three
formulations as capital: subcultural knowledge, unsta-
ble equilibriums, and discursive weapons, and even the
word discursive indicates that there is some kind of
“repetition” or “thematic matter from within an estab-
lished meme” (Wiggins & Bowers, 2015, p. 7). In addition,
Seiffert-Brockmann, Diehl, and Dobusch (2018) indicate
that memes contain three types of communication logic:
wasteful play online, social media political expression,
and cultural evolution. Finally, Shifman (2014) views
memes as playing a role in the “new landscape of
Web-based political participation, both in grassroots and
top-down campaigns” (p. 122). In this article, we focus on
the discursive weapons and features of political expres-
sion that are directly linked to fake news discourses and
main functions of memes.
Due to the affordances of social media, political
memes often have global outreach as they are used in
different political contexts and regions in relation to resis-
tance, activism, and “democratic subversion” (Shifman,
2014, p. 123). They often have many implied meanings
that carry ideological undertones. In China, for instance,
memes are used to express political views about social
norms (Yang, 2014), while memes in Russia are often
employed as a networked political action and protest
against Vladimir Putin (Lonkila, 2017). In some cases,
photoshopped images presented in the form of memes
are used to protest perceived injustice regarding police
acts (Bayerl & Stoynov, 2016). In the US, some ironic
memes were used to make comparisons between Barack
Obama and Martin Luther King such as the case ‘I Have a
Drone’ meme challenge (Howley, 2016). In other words,
memes can express “reactions to and protests against
political events and figureheads” (Häkkinen & Leppänen,
2014, p. 7). In a Twitter study on the 2014 Brazilian
presidential election, a total of 599 memes were ana-
lyzed following Shifman’s conceptualization, categorizing
them as follows: persuasive, grassroots action, and pub-
lic discussion (Chagas, Freire, Rios, & Magalhães, 2019).
Another study examined the use of memes on Twitter
during the 2015 State of the Nation Debate in Spain,
and the content analysis shows significant differences
in the use of memes by a variety of Spanish political
parties (Martínez-Rolán & Piñeiro-Otero, 2016). Similarly,
during the 2008 US election, video memes like ‘Obama
Girl,’ ‘Wassup,’ and ‘Yes We Can’ became very popular
attracting the attention of millions of users (Shifman,
2014, p. 124), while other memes were used to troll
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Barack Obama during the 2012 presidential campaign,
presenting him as unpatriotic such as using the ‘crotch
salute,’ ‘left-hand salute,’ and ‘Veterans Day non-salute’
memes (Burroughs, 2013). Finally, and as will be men-
tioned below, memes were aggressively used during
the 2016 US election often targeting Hillary Clinton and
Donald Trump (Denisova, 2019). In brief, memes are
viewed as creative and often funny political productions
that are associated with activism, social movements,
political protests, and cultural resistance.
Yet, memes have also been lately weaponized,
hijacked, and exploited by hate groups, state-run
trolls, and extremists to support their political agenda.
Numerous studies examined this aspect of memes’ use
mostly by alt-right trolls and groups (Bay, 2018; Bogerts
& Fielitz, 2018; Dematagoda, 2017; Flisfeder, 2018;
Hannan, 2018; Harmer & Lumsden, 2019; Heikkilä, 2017;
Woolley & Guilbeault, 2017). For instance, Russian trolls
actively used memes to target young people, mostly
showing Western leaders as fascists, while Ukrainian sol-
diers were presented as Nazis with fake photoshopped
images (Aro, 2016, p. 125). These types of memes are
regarded as toxic because they carry different types of
hate speech discourses (Coker, 2008, p. 911). However,
empirical research on Instagram as well as on fake
news discourses is not available despite the fact that
a US Senate Intelligence Committee report indicated
that Russian trolls actively used Instagram more than
Facebook during the 2016 election (Frier & Dennis, 2018).
Hence, this study fills another gap in literature on the
issue of toxic speech on Instagram.
In general, many of the US President Donald Trump’s
followers on Reddit were active in trolling and distribut-
ing ‘dank memes’ during the 2016 US election. These
types of memes are characterized as low-quality images
or videos whose main purpose is the dissemination
of jokes. Engaged in the so-called ‘Great Meme War,’
those supporters call themselves ‘keyboard commandos’
whose goal is to “harass Trump’s detractors and flood
the Internet with pro-Trump, anti-Hillary Clinton propa-
ganda” (Schreckinger, 2017). This was part of Meme
War I that was meant to get Donald Trump elected
(Roose, 2017) with the help of ‘meme armies’ that
lately announced that Meme War II has already start-
ed (Roose, 2017) and is meant to keep Trump in pow-
er. In a recent study on Trump’s followers on the
subreddit /r/The Donald (T D), the authors highlighted
how fake news stories are widely circulated such as the
one calling for action on the murder of the Democratic
National Committee (DNC) employee Seth Rich, for his
fatal incident was falsely linked to a conspiracy theory
revolving around his connection to the DNC email leak
(Flores-Saviaga, Keegan, & Savage, 2018). Aside from
Reddit, other social media platforms like 4chan received
some scholarly attention regarding the study of Trump’s
trolls and their memes such as ‘Trump Train’ and ‘You
can’t stump the Trump’ (Merrin, 2019). Other popular
memes include the far-right ‘Pepe the Frog’ and the
‘Deplorables’ ones which present Trump himself as Pepe
the Frog figure (Hine et al., 2017; Merrin, 2019, p. 208).
As a matter of fact, Trump promoted the meme of Pepe
the Frog on his Twitter account in 2016 (Revesz, 2016),
which assisted in making some of the alt-right symbols
become mainstream (Davey, Saltman, & Birdwell, 2018).
In brief, the ‘Great Meme Wars’ are waging on differ-
ent social media outlets in which political trolls from dif-
ferent ideological backgrounds try to exert their cultur-
al power and control over the online discourses. Since
there is a dearth of empirical research of political memes
on Instagram, this study fills a few gaps in the academic
literature. This study attempts to answer the following
research questions:
RQ1: What is the nature of the main online communi-
ties that discuss fake news with Instagram’s political
memes?
RQ2: What are the dominant topics of fake news dis-
courses in these memes?
3. Method
The data collection in this study was done in two stages.
The first stage involved collecting 293,773 Instagram
posts for the period between 30 September 2012 to
13 November 2018 using Netlytic academic subscrip-
tion. However, when Instagram changed its Application
Programming Interface rules in late 2018, the data col-
lection stopped, so the researcher adapted a Python
script that collected JSON file for each Instagram post
using the search term #fakenews. The search resulted in
collecting 551,402 Instagram messages posted between
24 February 2012 to 21 December 2018 by 198,684
unique users (Figure 1). The Python script collected old-
er data dating back to 2012 which referenced #fakenews,
while any deleted posts were not retrieved from the
platform. In this regard, the highest number of posts
(n = 10,294) were posted on October 21, 2018, which
coincided with a tweet from President Donald Trump on
the same day, stating: “Facebook has just stated that
they are setting up a system to ‘purge’ themselves of
Fake News. Does that mean CNN will finally be put out
of business?” (Trump, 2018). The Python script has limita-
tions, for it only collected Instagram posts that are avail-
able online, constituting about 50% of the total number
of posts referencing #fakenews on the platform.
After the data collection, a number of mixed
methodological measures were followed to analyze the
Instagram posts. First, topic modelling was used with
the use of a commercial software called QDA Miner—
WordStat 8. Topic modeling is a machine learning lan-
guage technique based on analyzing unstructured data.
For our study, we used Non-negative matrix factorization
(NNMF) approach which is a text mining method (Pauca,
Shahnaz, Berry, & Plemmons, 2004), often employed
in investigating a variety of issues like topics identi-
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Figure 1. Timeline of Instagram posts distribution referencing #fakenews.
fication and monitoring (Vaca, Mantrach, Jaimes, &
Saerens, 2014). NNMF topics were ranked based on
their coherence which “refers to the overall quality
and the semantic relatedness of the terms appearing
in a topic descriptor’’ (Belford, Mac Namee, & Greene,
2018, pp. 8–9). The same computer software was used
in identifying the most recurrent hashtags, user men-
tions, most recurrent words and phrases as well as their
co-occurrences measured through proximity plots.
Second, we used pivot tables to identify the unique
users though the process was tedious because the
Python script only provides individual user ID numbers
in JSON format, so the author had to convert the files
in bulk into Excel and individually search for the top
Instagram usernames on the platform. Using inductive
coding, a qualitative examination of 20 users was ini-
tially conducted by two coders to examine any emerg-
ing categories (Wimmer & Dominick, 2013), and three
main online communities were identified, mostly cen-
tered around personalized discussion of famous indi-
viduals: (1) Pro-Trump, (2) Anti-Trump, (3) Bolsonaro-
related, (4) Other. Intercoder reliability test was conduct-
ed using Krippendorf Alpha test (𝛼 = 1.0.). From this rep-
resentative sample, five accounts were initially suspend-
ed or deleted including three pro-Trump and two with-
out clear affiliation. The latter category included users
who have no clear political affiliation and often refer
to #dankmemes, while a few others focused on general
news dissemination, conspiracy theories, marketing, and
creative art and photography. Some of the irrelevant con-
spiracy theories promoted include the illuminati, vegan-
ism, UFOs, and the notion that earth is flat. These users
were excluded from the study due to the diversity of their
posts and their small numbers in the dataset. The third
online community included five users dealing with the
populist Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, who posted
in Portuguese, repeatedly adding the hashtag #fakenews
to their posts. This is another minor online community
that is excluded from the study because the author is
not familiar with Portuguese language. Afterwards, the
top 100 most active users, who collectively sent 100,507
Instagram posts, were thoroughly examined by studying
their online profiles, other Instagram posts if available,
and the archived Instagram posts in case their accounts
were deleted.
Ultimately, the study adds a unique aspect that has
not been included before in fake news research on social
media. In this regard, the computational analysis of a
large number of images in media and communication dis-
cipline is rare, and this study attempts to fill a gap in liter-
ature especially in relation to Instagram research. We fol-
lowed here the recommendation made by Highfield and
Leaver (2016) who stress that “developing approaches
to track and study the visual as widespread social media
form, including across platforms as content is shared and
reappropriated, is a necessary undertaking for a critical
understanding of social media use” (p. 58). Out of the
total sample of collected Instagram posts, there were
310,649 visuals (56.3%) that were automatedly tagged
by Instagram. The platform sometimes provides an auto-
mated description of images that includes thousands of
categories like ‘1 person,’ ‘tree, snow, sky, table and out-
door,’ or ‘3 people, meme, crowd and text.’ These visu-
al tags can appear if one hovers with the mouse over
some but not all Instagram images. In our study, we
found over 5,900 different tag categories. We textually
analyzed these visual tags as well as 4,596 textual con-
tent (0.8%) in these visuals (memes that contain text) in
order to add more depth into our textual analysis. In this
study, we found that fake news discourses on Instagram
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are more likely to include images 78.9% (n = 435,387),
videos 14.3% (n = 79,004), and less frequently sidecar
images 6.7% (n= 37,011), which refers to a series of pho-
tos posted by one user and dealing with a similar theme
or event.
Finally, research ethics clearance was not required
from the author’s university because the social media
data is publicly available. More importantly, informed
consent from active social media users is not usually
needed when conducting critical media research like the
case study examined here that involves alt-right users
(see Townsend & Wallace, n.d., pp. 11–12).
4. Results and Discussion
This study focuses on the examination of political memes
in relation to fake news discourses on Instagram. Its goal
is to understand the nature of the active users and their
online communities as well as the main topics discussed
on Instagram since there is a gap in literature on this
research aspect. To answer the first research question
on the nature of the online communities on Instagram,
we found that the most dominant online community
among the top 100 most active users is the Pro-Trump
one (68%) followed by Anti-Trump (10%) online commu-
nity. A third minor online community is formed around
the Brazilian populist President, Jair Bolsonaro (5%). The
Pro-Trump camp posted 69,630 messages constituting
69.2% of the total posts of the active users, while the
Anti-Trump online community sent 14,061 ones which
amounts to 13.9% only. Indeed, the Pro- and Anti-Trump
users form the major Instagram communities which dis-
cuss fake news, and what makes them distinctive and
unique is the personalized praise as well as attacks or
trolling activity against individual politicians. This has
been evident not only in the qualitative investigation of
the most active users presented above and in the follow-
ing paragraph but also the examination of the top posts,
most recurrent words and phrases, and more important-
ly the large data analysis of the accompanying images.
Regarding the visual tags, Figure 2 provides a repre-
sentation of the top 50 most popular image descriptions,
and we found that the top one is related to images con-
taining ‘1 person’ (n = 71,876) followed by images with
‘text’ (n = 36,508), ‘1 person, text’ (n = 30,650), ‘2 peo-
ple’ (n = 24,134), and ‘2 people, text’ (10,201). As can be
seen, there is a personalized type of messages in these
visual discourses that mostly deal with one person, which
explains the prevalence of certain individuals in the tex-
tual discourses about fake news on Instagram. In fact,
the total number of images containing one person in dif-
ferent formats is 136,716, constituting 44% of the total
tagged images. This is the highest percentage among all
the other visual tags.
As for the visual analysis, we agree with Highfield and
Leaver’s (2016) assertation that the “visual is central to
everyday life and social media practices” (p. 49). In this
study, we found that Donald Trump is the main focus
of the visual discussion, for he is part of the most fre-
quent phrase (n= 338) if one takes into account the com-
bination of the two phrases ‘Trump Realdonaldtrump’
(n = 173) and ‘Donald Trump’ (n = 165). The same
emphasis is found in the most frequent words in the
image texts, for ‘Trump’ comes first (n = 1229) if one
ignores the basic tag words like ‘text,’ ‘person,’ and
‘people,’ and without taking into account the word
‘Realdonaldtrump’ (n = 220). Other popular politicians
include ‘Obama’ (n = 165) and Clinton (n = 129), while
the recurrent phrases include ‘Hillary Clinton’ (n = 66)
and ‘Ben Shapiro’ (n= 53), the famous conservative com-
mentator. Once again, this finding confirms the discus-
sion above on the personalized type of discussion on fake
news which is evident in the visual findings as well as the
textual analysis presented below.
To further understand these two main online commu-
nities, we provide here more in-depth analysis of some
of the top 20 most active users (Table 1). These users con-
sist of a majority of pro-Trump Instagrammers (n = 17)
and only a couple of anti-Trump ones as well as one with
no clear affiliation. This table clearly indicates the domi-
nance of the pro-Trump community who regard them-
selves as meme warriors, as mentioned above. Such
users often use a long list of hashtags in order to spread
their memes as far as possible which includes sever-
al themes like praise for their community leaders and
members (#Rarepepe, #Kekistan, #Praisekek, and #kek),
attacks against democrats and liberals (#liberalsSuck,
#liberaltears, #draintheswamp, and #libtards), sup-
port for Donald Trump (#MAGA, #IsMyPresident,
#buildthewall, #trumptrain, and #Trump2020; see
Figure 3), and criticism against liberal mainstream
media especially CNN (#CNNisFakenews and #fakenews).
These results are actually similar to a similar investiga-
tion on Twitter that examined the hashtag #fakenews
(Al-Rawi, 2019a). Regarding the last theme, the major-
ity of users in this community express doubts and mis-
trust in mainstream media such as the case of the user
@stoppingtheabuse who describes himself as follows:
“I am a patriot. I am a proud American. I am white. I am
Christian. I am a republican….I don’t listen to fake news.”
To examine a few top users from this commu-
nity, the 7th most active Instagrammer calls him-
self “@Captain_Kekistan” which is a reference to the
Hollywood superhero, Captain America, and it is also evi-
dent in the user’s profile that refers to the same charac-
ter though (s)he changed the color into green (Figure 4).
As for ‘Kekistan,’ it is a popular far-right term which is
based on a coded language used among this community
who believe in conspiracy theories like QAnon (Al-Rawi,
2020; Merrin, 2019). The latter is a conspiracy theory
term that implies the existence of a deep state in the
US whose goal is allegedly overthrowing or undermin-
ing Donald Trump’s presidency (Al-Rawi, 2020). Another
example of a Pro-Trump user, conservative__americans
posts similar Instagram messages with those periodi-
cally sent by Captain_Kekistan. The user’s full name
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Figure 2. The top 50 most associated Instagram’s visual tags.
is ‘Right Wing Meme Factory,’ denoting the purpose
of this account. Interestingly, the user’s online account
shows only four messages though (s)he sent 1399 posts
archived in our dataset which means that (s)he period-
ically deletes messages probably to avoid detection or
removal by the platform. This is also a social media strat-
egy used by drug dealers (Al-Rawi, 2019b) and state-run
users (Al-Rawi & Shukla, 2020) to spam others while
making sure their online presence remains active on
social media platforms. I call these users ‘sleeper cells’
because they get activated when needed. After perform-
ing their required duties, they disguise themselves again
by removing all their public messages. Another way of
avoiding detection is by keeping the account private such
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Figure 3. A screenshot of a Pro-Trump follower using the hashtag #fakenews (https://www.instagram.com/_conservative_
warrior_/?hl=en).
Figure 4. Screenshots of Captain_Kekistan on Instagram (https://www.instagram.com/captain_kekistan/?hl=en).
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as the case of @conservative.comedy that posted 705
Instagram messages as well as @but_muh_clownshow
that is discussed below. Some of the other gener-
al features of this online community are its positions
on several issues such as anti-immigration, distrust of
Muslims, nationalism, protectionism, and xenophobia.
For instance, @pjb101263 posted 597 Instagram mes-
sages referencing #fakenews including the following one
that shows the US Congresswoman, Ilhan Omar, flying
an airplane towards what appears to be the twin towers
(Figure 5). Another feature that some users in this online
community employ is anti-Semitic discourses which are
manifested in several ways including the use of far-right
hashtags (see above), emojis like🐸 that was used 794
times, and the triple parentheses or echoes (Williams,
2016). In our dataset, we found the echoes used 213
times in the public discourses on fake news. For exam-
ple, @trumpmemz user mentions that Elon Musk is trig-
gering Jewish mainstream journalists for his alleged plan
to create a ranking website for journalists’ credibility.
While the study is being written, two more Pro-
Trump accounts were deleted by Instagram includ-
ing @vertical_stance and @excuse_me_excuse_me_.
It is not clear why the accounts were removed,
though. Similar accounts shortly emerged like verti-
cal_stance2.0 whose original motto is ‘Exposing the
mainstream media’ and ‘Journalism is dead.’ As for
@excuse_me_excuse_me_, the user acts like a troll
who has been repeatedly blocked and deleted, stat-
ing: “My dear conservative friends😁😎 I have made
a second account, just in case. 😉 This will remain
my main page, but feel free to follow the other one
@excuse_me_excuse_me_.” The user coordinates with
similar trolls in attacking liberal users. One post, for
instance, praises the collective efforts directed at a par-
ody account of Hillary Clinton, mentioning: “Guys, you
really hit that profile! @hillarry_clintton😂😂😂 Last
post can’t be commented any more, so….Good job!
😎👍👍’’ or “Tag a liberal😁😁.’’ As a member of an
active online community, this user repeatedly urges his
friends and followers to target democratic leaders like
the real account of Hillary Clinton: “👮👮👮@hillaryclin-
ton➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖’’ as well
as follow other active users or influential in the com-
munity, stating: “Follow my partners: 🚨@thetrump
phenomena🚨/🚨 @usa_everyday 🚨/🚨 @authentic
donaldjtrump🚨.’’ Similarly, numerous other users like
@stoppingtheabuse and @conservative.comedy encour-
age their friends to re-post favorable messages and fol-
low other members in the community by listing their
Instagram usernames. This technique is similar to the
Swarmcast model in communication wherein affiliated
users gather around their opponents to attack them
(Al-Rawi, 2018, p. 743). In brief, there is a clear coordina-
tion of organized efforts to identify and troll liberals on
Instagram in order to silence or limit their activities. It is
important to mention here that it is not possible to know
whether these coordinated trolling activities are central-
ized or not as they can be organically driven by conserva-
tive fans and followers.
On the other hand, the anti-Trump online commu-
nity on Instagram, which is much smaller and less orga-
nized than the Pro-Trump one, is often involved in trolling
Republicans and the far-right group. Some of the popu-
lar hashtags used by this anti-Trump community include
#Blacklivesmatter, #Resist, #Dumptrump, #Fucktrump,
#Notmypresident, #Makeamericablueagain, #Obama
care, #LGBTQ, and #Progressive. To take a couple
of examples, the second top user @Breakupartist
(n = 5,620) almost always trolls Donald Trump and
Figure 5. A photoshopped image showing Congresswoman Ilhan Omar as a 9/11 attacker.
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his administration, sometimes using offensive language
similar to the discourse used by the Pro-Trump com-
munity. In Figure 6, we find that Trump was photo-
shopped to make him look like Hitler, while the US
President logo sign was appropriated to read ‘Moron
of the United States’ and MOTUS instead of POTUS.
In addition, the image designer used the triple paren-
theses or echoes as a gesture of resistance against anti-
Semitic trolls and in solidarity towards Jews (Williams,
2016). Another user, @ledsjam_trump, sent 450 mes-
sages on fake news, describing himself as follows in
his profile: “No Drumpf….Non-Stop! I’m the 400 lb
troll in my parents’ basement, that you’ve heard about.
🔥Dedicated to Mocking Our Nation’s Highest Ranking
Buffoon. Homemade. RESIST!” (Figure 6).
To sum up, there are two distinct online communi-
ties that are active in relation to the discourses about
fake news on Instagram. Each community trolls each oth-
er, but the pro-Trump one is more active and visible
which is apparent in their organized efforts, total fre-
quency of their posts, and prevalence in the top 100 most
active users. The active members of these two commu-
nities regard themselves as activists who have a duty
to counter the hegemony and attack the credibility of
their opponents, and the ultimate goal is to control the
discourses, gain more followers and sympathizers, and
possibly influence the minds of Instagram users through
the use of appealing, witty, and funny political memes.
The results of this study align with previous research on
the role of memes in enhancing community ties and cre-
ating a collective identity (Shifman, 2012) especially that
sharing certain memes is a reflection of the ideological
affiliation of some online communities and their gate-
keeping practices (Burgess, 2008; Miltner, 2014). In addi-
tion, the political polarization that separates the two
main communities is translated into tense and often
toxic Instagram content that is often described as an
ongoing “memes warfare” (Al-Rawi, 2020; Häkkinen &
Leppänen, 2014). Again, this is in line with previous
research that examined social media and political polar-
ization (Bay, 2018; Heikkilä, 2017) such as some polarized
social media content posted during the 2016 US election
(Denisova, 2019).
To answer the second research question on the main
topics on Instagram in relation to fake news discours-
es, we find that the top five topics and their associ-
ated descriptors include four that are related to the
Pro-Trump online community including Alllivesmatter,
Rightwing, Draintheswamp, Republican, and only one rel-
evant to the anti-Trump camp which is Notmypresident
(Table 2). To provide more context, we will explore only
a few ones here due to the limited space. The first
topic is Alllivesmatter which is a term used by some
conservatives to counter the claims of the Black Lives
Matter movement. The use of this term suggests that
all Americans including whites and police forces should
be given equal weight and importance when it comes
to issues of social justice and equality, ignoring the sys-
temic injustice and historical circumstances that created
economic and political inequality in the first place. Some
of the associated words with this topic include a clear
attack against Democrats with the word ‘Liberallogic’ to
demean their arguments as well as other supportive
terms like MAGA and Makeamericagreatagain. Criticism
against liberals is also manifested in the third topic
which is entitled ‘Drain the Swamp,’ a political term
modified by President Trump to attack his Democratic
opponents and accuse them of corruption and inept-
ness (Bierman, 2018). In relation to this topic, we find
that some of the associated terms include Antifa, the
anti-Fascist movement that is often the object of attacks
by far-right groups, as well as CNN and its constant
association with fake news. In fact, Trump encouraged
his followers to troll CNN by sending funny or criti-
cal memes and videos (Gallagher, 2019). On the other
hand, there are also words that show solidarity and unity
among the Pro-Trump community members like MAGA,
Mypresident, Deplorable, that was appropriated from
Figure 6. Anti-Trump Instagram users trolling Trump using #fakenews (https://www.instagram.com/ledsjam_trump/
?hl=en).
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Table 2. The major topics on Instagram in relation to #fakenews.
Topic Keywords Coherence
Alllivesmatter Alllivesmatter; Constitution; Media; Democrats; Media; Liberallogic; Meme; 0.514
La; Bluelivesmatter; Partners; Makeamericagreatagain; Para; Patriot;
Donaldtrump; Memes; MAGA; Conservative; Republicans
Rightwing Rightwing; Para; LOL; Time; Maga; Donaldtrump; Patriot; Deplorable; Republicans; 0.497
Americafirst; America; President; Buildthewall; Conservative; Liberallogic; Fake;
Makeamericagreatagain; CNN; La; Bluelivesmatter; Patriots; God; Republican;
Politics; Follow; Media; Democrats; Meme; Partners
Draintheswamp Draintheswamp; Merica; Qanon; Fakenews; Realdonaldtrump; Antifa; Follow; 0.429
CNN; Deplorable; MAGA; De; Fake; Mypresident; America
Republican Real; Republican; Resist; Buildthewall; Bluelivesmatter; Americafirst; American; 0.409
Media; La; Makeamericagreatagain; Donaldtrump; Rightwing; Patriot; Maga;
President; Conservative; Deplorable; LOL; Media; Republicans
Notmypresident Government; Notmypresident; Foxnews; De; America; Media; GOP; President; 0.341
Deplorable; God; Constitution; Meme; Rightwing; Americafirst; Real;
Conservative; Resist; Time; Para; Make; Donaldtrump; LOL
Hillary Clinton’s 2016 interview (Caffier, 2017), Merica
instead of America which is often used in popular culture
discourses to express patriotism, and Qanon.
To further investigate the main topics, we examined
the most recurrent words to understand the salience
of some terms that carry political or cultural mean-
ings. Aside from the common words like ‘fakenews’
and ‘fake,’ Table 3 shows the top 50 most recurrent
words and we can find that ‘Trump’ (n = 271,241)
comes second due to his dominance in the discus-
sion by the two main online communities. Yet, most
of the discussion is supportive of the US President
because the subsequent words that follow Trump are
mostly related to his party and policies like ‘MAGA’
Table 3. The most frequent words used in the Instagram posts on fake news.
No. Word Frequency No. Word Frequency
1. Fakenews 498,527 26. People 35,601
2. Trump 271,241 27. Meme 34,143
3. MAGA 128,505 28. Funny 34,006
4. Conservative 123,527 29. Buildthewall 32,962
5. News 117,173 30. Truth 32,469
6. Republican 89,493 31. Liberallogic 32,037
7. Donaldtrump 89,113 32. Repost 31,366
8. CNN 85,730 33. Merica 29,365
9. Makeamericagreatagain 84,974 34. Obama 28,439
10. America 81,886 35. Trumpmemes 26,056
11. USA 68,445 36. Bluelivesmatter 26,003
12. Fake 62,789 37. Russia 25,456
13. Follow 60,875 38. Resist 25,374
14. Politics 56,493 39. Democrats 25,231
15. Trumptrain 53,447 40. Liberals 24,857
16. Memes 51,352 41. American 24,127
17. Liberal 47,452 42. Love 23,764
18. Draintheswamp 46,622 43. Ndamendment 23,613
19. Presidenttrump 45,107 44. Freedom 23,026
20. Democrat 40,692 45. Patriot 22,954
21. Foxnews 40,152 46. Libtards 22,735
22. Potus 40,071 47. Military 22,556
23. President 39,895 48. Notmypresident 21,774
24. Media 38,803 49. Partners 21,469
25. Americafirst 38,330 50. GOP 21,416
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(Make America Great Again), ‘conservative,’ ‘republican,’
‘Donaldtrump,’ ‘Makeamericagreatagain,’ ‘Trumptrain,’
‘Americafirst,’ ‘Buildthewall,’ ‘Bluelivesmatter’ etc. At the
same time, there are many words used that indicate
trolling activity or attacks against liberal democrats like
‘Draintheswamp,’ ‘Liberallogic,’ and ‘Libtards.’ On the
other hand, the top 50 words only show two words
that are often used by the anti-Trump online communi-
ty including ‘Resist’ (n = 25,374) and ‘Notmypresident’
(n = 21,774), which indicates the minor presence of this
online community.
In terms of media outlets, two channels are refer-
enced in the list of top terms including CNN (n = 85,730)
and Fox News (n = 40,152). To further understand how
these outlets are used in the online discussion, we
examined the most recurrent phrases or combination of
words. In this regard, two of the most recurrent phras-
es are ‘CNN fakenews’ (n = 18382) and ‘Fakenews CNN’
(n = 14511) that are used by the Pro-Trump online com-
munity. We also examined the co-occurrence of the word
‘CNN’ and found that it is firstly connected with the
term ‘fakenews’ (n = 72,765) with a very strong asso-
ciation (< 0.901)—1 is complete and 0 has no associ-
ation. To a lesser extent, we find other phrases that
indicate opposition to the Trump’s administration includ-
ing ‘Fakenews Dumptrump Nevertrump’ (n = 5924) and
‘Fakenews Dumptrump Nevertrump Resist Fucktrump’
(n = 5866).
To corroborate the above findings, we further exam-
ined the most mentioned users in the online discus-
sion. Similar to the above findings, we found that
President Donald Trump comes first as the most men-
tioned user (n = 10,743) immediately followed by CNN
(n = 5,768). In the top 20 most referenced users,
Trump’s son, @Donaldjtrumpjr, is also among the most
referenced as well as three other liberal mainstream
media outlets including the New York Times,Washington
Post, and ABC, while Fox News comes near the end
of the list. The only other politician included in the
list is the Brazilian president, @Jairmessiasbolsonaro,
and two of his sons Eduardo, @bolsonarosp, and Flavio,
@flaviobolsonaro. In total and aside from five main-
stream media outlets, there are nine Pro-Trump users,
three Bolsonaro-related users, two deleted accounts,
and one irrelevant one. Similar to the discussion found
above, some active Pro-Trump users mention oth-
er ones in their community to get support such as
@Teentrumpsupporter who lists 13 other Instagrammers
as ‘partners.’ Other users with deleted accounts create
similar profile names by sometimes adding a number,
letter, or word to the original username. For example,
after @But_Muh_Russia got deleted from Instagram, the
user created @but_muh_clownshow, describing himself
as follows: “(((They))) are scared of you. Nothing is more
powerful than the public being awake and collectively
free- thinking! Formerly @ but_muh_russia.” In addition
to the anti-Semitic use of the echoes, the image profile
uses the far-right symbol of Pepe the Frog as well as a hid-
den lynching noose that is reminiscent of the slavery era
though this time it looks like an implied threat against
the LGBTQ community. This is evident in the head cap
the Frog is wearing (Figure 7), for this clown pepe figure
is often called Honk Honk or Honkler in popular culture
and is intentionally used in an attempt to reclaim the rain-
bow symbol from the LGBTQ community (Jhaveri, 2019;
Know Your Meme, 2018).
As for the visual analysis, we decided to combine
more than one approach in the examination of visuals
because it becomes a more effective method in under-
standing images (Rose, 2016, p. 99). As memes contain
text embedded in the images, we decided to examine it.
Aside from the word ‘Trump’ and a few other politicians
Figure 7. A Pro-Trump user on Instagram expressing implied threats.
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mentioned above, we found that other frequent words
and phrases in these memes include ‘CNN’ (n = 253)
which is the top channel targeted followed by ‘Fox News’
(n = 105) and ‘Media Is Fake News’ (n = 34). This indi-
cates the nature of visual attention to these two chan-
nels by the two online communities each accusing the
other of being a fake news outlet. In this regard, we exam-
ined the co-occurrence of the words ‘ABC,’ ‘CNN,’ ‘Fox,’
and ‘MSNBC’ in the visual texts and found that ‘CNN’ is
firstly and mostly linked to ‘fakenews.’ In fact, the terms
‘fake’ co-occurs 28 times with ‘CNN’ (< 0.015 associa-
tion), 6 times with ‘ABC,’ 3 ones with ‘NBC,’ and 3 others
with ‘Fox.’
As for the other visual tags analysis, some of the iden-
tified objects can be relevant like ‘stripes’ which refer
to the US flag, mostly denoting nationalistic expression
through memes. This is, in fact, not unique to the US con-
text, for using one’s national flag is similar to the ‘cyber-
nationalism’ sentiments expressed by some Chinese
Instagram users (Fang, & Repnikova, 2018, p. 16). In our
dataset, the US flag was used 790 times in these visuals
in 9 different formats like ‘1 person, stripes’ (n = 140),
‘stripes and outdoor’ (n = 66), ‘standing and stripes’
(n= 50), ‘stripes and text’ (n= 33). The qualitative assess-
ment of a sample of these visual posts involving the US
flag shows that the majority are Pro-Trump followers
though there are different other users discussing it most-
ly to express nationalistic sentiment like the following
user: “I’m a proud American. Are you?#MAGA#Trump
#Bigdon#Thedon#Buildthewall#Makeamericagreatagain
#Crookedhillary#Draintheswamp,” while another one
stated: “I love this country! Thank God we have a great
President who fixing it! Look how beautiful our flag is!
#MAGA” [sic].
Another aspect that requires analysis is the examina-
tion of the most recurrent posts that are used in the
online discussion. Aside from the neutral, irrelevant,
and ambiguous messages, we find that 15 out of the
20 top posts are part of the Pro-Trump online commu-
nity that shares supportive hashtags on Donald Trump
like #Trump2020 and #LoveTrump including some that
are critical of mainstream media. For instance, the fifth
most frequent post (n = 536) partly reads as follows:
“#EnemyOfThePeople = @nytimes = #fakenews/fascists
#EnemyOfThePeople = @cnn = #fakenews/fascists
#EnemyOfThePeople = @washingtonpost = fakenews
#fascists #JeffSessions = #EnemyOfThePeople
@thejusticedept = #EnemyOfThePeople @abcnetwork
= Nazis #WalkAway.”
The same applies to the top 20 most commented
on posts that include 9 out of 20 Pro-Trump messages
which received 79,425 comments. On the other hand,
there are only two anti-Trump posts that received 9,132
comments, while the other most commented on posts
are neutral or did not show a clear political affiliation.
Regarding the latter anti-Trump community, one of the
top most commented on posts includes a call to follow
other similar users in the community, stating: “Go fol-
low my partners: @_proud_liberal_, @texansocialdem,
@the_norwegian_social_democrat…etc.” This is, indeed,
a tactic that is similar to what the Pro-Trump communi-
ty follows.
To conclude, the visual and textual examination of
fake news discourses on Instagram shows two high-
ly polarized online communities separated by oppo-
site political alliances. These two online communities
exchange political memes that are mostly centered
around individual prominent politicians especially the
US President Donald Trump. However, the Pro-Trump
community is much larger, more active, and organized
than the anti-Trump community. At the same time, some
active virtual ‘warriors’ of the Pro-Trump community
show sympathy or affiliation with the far-right by using
their hate and racist icons like Pepe the Frog, while
expressing distrust in liberal mainstream media espe-
cially CNN. These findings indicate that Instagram has
become weaponized by the two main online communi-
ties, and memes are used in an ongoing political online
warfare to attack and demean the opponents. Meme
War II is an ongoing daily reality on Instagram which
requires more scholarly attention.
Finally, future research on fake news discourses need
to include other under-researched visual platforms like
Pinterest and Flickr in order to examine the nature of
online communities and political memes that exist on
these social media venues. In addition, in-depth inter-
views with members of the different Meme War com-
munities need to be conducted to further understand
their political strategies that are employed on Instagram
and possibly elsewhere. Also, cross-national compara-
tive research is vital, for this study identified an online
community that is centered around the figure of the
Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, so it is important to
understand how fake news discourses are used by the
active members of this community.
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